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1. Introduction 
 
 
The restructuring of old firms inherited from the centrally planned system is a key policy 
issue for the success of transition reforms.  It is commonly accepted that failure to restructure at 
the enterprise level is likely to undermine macroeconomic stabilization efforts, endanger the 
health of the financial sector, and lead to a reduction of the population's overall standard of 
living.  
 
Prior to transition, enterprises operated in a highly distorted economic environment.  As 
the transition to a market economy started, state enterprises began to confront hard budget 
constraints for the first time.  This severely limited enterprises’ access to sources of both short-
term operational as well as longer-term development funds.  Enterprises found themselves in a 
situation where restructuring - adjusting their operations in line with market mechanisms – 
became of primary importance.  The aim of this paper is to assess the extent of restructuring of 
Romanian enterprises.  The evolution of enterprise performance will be presented and some of 
the factors triggering restructuring and the challenges of implementation will be analyzed.  
 
In order to assess the extent of the changes in performance, three analyses on enterprise 
financial data of 6,203 enterprises were performed.  The objective was to identify the main 
directions of enterprise performance, measured in terms of profitability, capital utilization and 
capital structure, as well as changes in infrastructure, legal and regulatory framework and the 
enabling environment which might have led to restructuring.  The analysis will be based on 
assessing  the performance of the selected group of companies for which financial data was 
available during the period from 1994 to 1997.   
 
The first type of analysis to be carried out classifies the firms into groups based on their 
cash generating capacity and looks at changes in the structure of the groups.   
 
The second type of analysis considers the aggregate financial data of the group and uses 
financial analysis tools to spot broad trends in firms' behavior and also to offer explanations for 
the results from the first section.   
 
To understand the determinants for firm restructuring, the third analysis focuses on the 
changes in the relationships among firms, on the one hand, and creditors, suppliers, owners and 
employees, on the other hand.  The paper touches upon issues such as restructuring debt 
contracts, equity contracts and employee contracts. 
 
Finally, some conclusions will be drawn. 
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2.  Old Firms 
 
An OECD economic survey notes that “ the starting point for the transition process in 
Romania was, in many respects, more difficult than in other countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Pre-transition policies emphasized self-dependence, putting excessive focus on heavy 
industry and large infrastructure projects.  This strategy led to the depletion of domestic energy 
sources and induced inherited costly dependence on imports of energy and raw materials”1.  
 
Indeed, by standards of most market economies, Romania had a large industrial sector.  By 
the 1980s, 60 per cent of output and 38 per cent of employment were accounted for by industry.  
In the traditional pattern of socialist industrialization producer goods industries were promoted.  
By 1989, these accounted for 56 per cent of total industrial output.  This specialization was 
strongly influenced by Romania’s position in CMEA.  The second largest subsector was 
chemicals, including oil and petrochemicals, with 21 per cent of the total industrial output.  
Metallurgy, the third largest subsector, kept its share at about 9.8 per cent of industrial output 
throughout the 1980s. Like the composition of output, industrial location was determined by 
political and not efficiency considerations.  In many districts one large firm accounted for the 
majority of employment. 
 
The old firms inherited from the central planning system were highly energy intensive and 
obsolete.  Priority given to new investments other than modernization of the existing capital 
stock, combined with the decline in equipment imports resulted in a growing obsolescence of 
Romanian firms.   
 
In 1991, after two years of market reforms, old firms were already corporatized or turned 
into what were called regies autonomes.  Thus, about 7,432 commercial companies and 84 
national regies autonomes were established by the end of 19912.  But, some of the characteristics 
of old firms persisted in the newly corporatized, but still, state-owned enterprises: the limited 
supply of some key raw materials and energy products, input allocation, and, more importantly, 
limited decision-making decentralization.  
 
Perhaps one of the most challenging tasks for the Romanian Governments during transition 
has been the restructuring of this highly distorted economic system.  Contrary to other countries, 
Romania has chosen the “incrementalist” approach for restructuring the old firms.  Restructuring 
was sought along with preserving the existing capital stock, links with suppliers, creditors and  
employment levels.  
 
Changes in the Performance of  Firms  
 
In order to assess the extent of the changes in the performance of firms, two analyses of 
financial performance on 6,203 enterprises were performed.  The objective was to identify the 
                                                 
1 OECD Economic Surveys – Romania 1998 
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2 Source: National Bank – Annual Reports 1991 - 1995 
main directions of enterprise performance measured in terms of profitability, capital utilization 
and capital structure for both 1994 and 1997. 
  
Both analyses have concentrated on assessing the performance of the selected group of 
companies for both 1994 and 1997.  The first analysis classifies the firms into groups based on 
their performance and looks at the changes in the structure of the groups between 1994-1997.  
The second analysis considers the aggregate financial data of the group and uses financial 
analysis tools to spot broad trends in firm behavior and to explain results from the first section.  
 
The panel analyzed contains 6,203 firms, including both regies and commercial 
companies.  All sectors are represented: industry, agriculture, utilities, etc.  The employment in 
the sample amounts to 2,978,000 employees in 1994 and 2,299,000 in 1997.  The sample’s total 
turnover of GDP was about 86 percent in 1994 has decreased to 68 percent as of 1997.  
 
Grouping Firms by their Performance 
 
The ability of the firms to generate positive cash flow from operations is used in this 
analysis as an indication of firms' restructuring.  The distribution of enterprises included in the 
sample is done based on the following criteria: 
 
Table 1 : Cash Flow Categories 
 
Categories  Cash Flow Generation Condition 
  Profit/Loss from Operations  
 + Depreciation  
A = Gross Cash Flow from Operations <0 
 - Increase in Working Capital   
B =  <0 
 - Interest  
C   <0 
 - Exceptional Results   
D   <0 
 - Taxes  
E = Net Cash Flow from Operations <0 
F = Net Cash Flow from Operations >0 
 
Thus, firms were categorized according to their performance into six groups. 
 
Group A firms do not generate cash flow from operations ("cash hole companies"). 
 
Group B firms generate a positive gross cash flow from operation but not enough to cover 
the required working capital needs. 
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Group C firms generate a positive gross cash flow and can cover the working capital needs, 
but cannot cover interest payments. 
 
Group D firms generate a positive gross cash flow, cover the working capital needs, pay 
interest, but cannot cover exceptional results3. 
 
Group E firms generate enough positive cash flow to cover working capital needs, pay 
interest and penalties, cover the effects of exchange rates, but cannot cover tax payments. 
 
Group F firms generate positive net cash flow from operations and even remain with cash 
for investments. 
 
In 1994, out of the 6,203 firms in the sample, 3,549 firms were in the best category (F). In 
1997 the number of this category of firms increased to 4,228.  Table 2 presents the number of 
firms in each category in 1994 and 1997. 
 
Table 2 : Grouping of Companies by the Degree of Cash Generation 
 
GROUP 1994 1997 
A 401 396 
B 961 424 
C 952 571 
D 117 333 
E 223 251 
F 3,549 4,228 
All Firms 6,203 6,203 
 
A certain variability in the evolution of performance can be noticed.  Thus, only 76 percent 
of the firms in category F in 1997 are firms which maintained their position since 1994.  The rest 
of the 24 percent were almost equally distributed in lower performance categories.  
 
Also, out of the 401 firms in category A in 1994, only 17 percent remained in the same 
group, while about 51 percent transferred to group F.  
 
Of the total 6,203 firms, 4,137 firms improved or stayed with the same cash generation 
performance.  In the transition matrix (table 3), the gray area contains the firms which stayed or 
joined better performing groups. 
 
Of the total labor force employed in the 6,203 firms in 1994, about 22.3 percent had been 
laid off by1997.  Along with the redistribution of firms in the different groups of cash generation 
performance, a redistribution of the labor force took place.  While for the firms in group F the 
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3 Exceptional results should not have been included in this analysis; however, in Romania, large foreign exchange adjustments 
and penalties, the main constituents of the exceptional results, are quite common. 
labor force reduction was only by about 2 percent, for firms in groups A, B, and C the reduction 
was by more than 60 percent (Figure 1). 
 
Table 3 :  Transition Matrix 1994-1997 
 
    A 
396 
B 
424 
C 
571 
D 
333 
E 
251 
F 
4,228 
 
6,203 
A 
401 
17% 
 
8% 14% 8% 1% 51% 100% 
 
B 
961 
7% 8% 18% 6% 4% 57% 100% 
 
C 
952 
7% 6% 18% 9% 4% 57% 100% 
 
D 
117 
7% 9% 6% 13% 3% 62% 100% 
 
E 
223 
1% 8% 4% 3% 6% 78% 100% 
 
F 
3,549 
5% 6% 4% 4% 4% 76% 100% 
 
 
This analysis shows that the companies in the panel have improved their financial 
performance in 1997 compared to 1994.  
 
Figure 1 : Change in the Labor Force by Groups of Firms 
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The above analysis is largely based on an assumption which many may take as unrealistic 
in the transition context.  So far we implicitly assumed that the funds for goods or services 
delivered are actually paid off, and firms that do not pay go bankrupt.  However, this is a 
seriously limiting assumption in the context of the events of 1994-1997 (and even in the present 
day).  The reality of the situation in Romania is characterized by the large amounts of inter-
enterprise arrears accumulated during this period.  It should be noted that in the absence of 
financial discipline, debtors will choose to delay repaying their debts (to benefit from high 
 5
inflation, among other things) whenever they are able to delay their payments to suppliers, 
creditors or the state.  In what follows, better performance of enterprises in the panel could at 
least partially be due to the worsening of financial discipline.  
 
However, before jumping to specific conclusions, it is important to check what the 
composition of net cash flow from operations is.  In order to do that, the aggregate data of  the 
firms in the panel will be used to perform a cash flow computation for both 1994 and 1997.  For 
an easier interpretation of all figures they are computed as percentages of turnover.  Then, a ratio 
analysis for working capital management and debt structure elements is undertaken.  The 
analysis performed using aggregate financial data for the firms in the panel shows an 
improvement in cash flow dynamics. 
 
As Table 4 below shows, firms in the panel had ended 1997 with a positive net cash flow 
from operations representing 1.92  percent of the turnover.  This net cash flow covers working 
capital changes, financial charges, exceptional charges and the profit tax.  In 1994, the same cash 
flow position was only 0.23 per cent of turnover.  The better 1997 cash flow appears despite 
higher financial, exceptional and tax charges, and it is obviously a result of the small decrease in 
net working capital, compared to the increase from 1994.  This is the difference that has 
overridden the increases in the other charges and has led to a larger amount of extra cash in 1997 
compared to 1994. 
 
Table 4 : Elements of the Net Cash Flow from Operations 
 
1994 1997 %Difference
% of Turnover
Gross Cash Flow from Operations 11.31% 12.45% 10.10%
(-) Increase in Net Working Capital 4.03% -0.02% -100.46%
(-) Net Financial Charges 4.84% 5.88% 21.52%
(-) Net Exceptional Charges 0.31% 2.13% 587.59%
(-) Profit Tax 1.89% 2.54% 33.98%
(=) Net Cash Flow  from Operations 0.23% 1.92% 736.42%
 
 
The uses of generated “extra” cash are presented in Table 5.  In both years it has covered a 
small portion of capital investments, with the rest being financed mostly by increases in financial 
debt.  However, the latter use of the cash flow lies outside the scope of current study.  Thus, we 
will in turn focus on cash flows from operations. 
 
Table 5 : Net Cash Flow Utilization 
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1994 1997 %Difference
% of Turnover
Cash Flow from Investments, Financed from: -8.15% -8.99% 10.35%
Net Cash Flow from Operations 0.23% 1.92% 736.42%
Increase in Financial Debt 8.09% 6.33% -21.72%
Other Sources -0.17% 0.74% -531.34%
 
 
The objective is to find out if the better net cash flow from operations is a result of better 
performance or other causes.  For this, each element that composes the net cash flow from 
operations is further analyzed.   
 
Gross Cash Flow 
 
Table 6 : Gross Cash Flow Decomposition 
 
1994 1997 %Difference
% of Turnover
Operating Profit 8.96% 9.18% 2.42%
Depreciation 2.34% 3.27% 39.50%
Gross Cash Flow from Operations 11.31% 12.45% 10.10%  
 
The gross cash flow from operations represents the aggregate companies' capacity to 
generate cash from operations.  It is composed of operating profit plus non-cash charges 
(depreciation).  Both positions show slight improvements in 1997 (table 6).  However, if taken as 
is, the figure for operating profit may be misleading since it incorporates inflation whenever a 
company uses FIFO for inventory computation.  Additionally, inflation in 1997 has been much 
higher than in 1994, and most Romanian companies are using FIFO, so it is very likely that 1997 
operating profits are overstated. Fortunately, the next position we analyze accounts for this 
concern.  
 
Changes in Working Capital 
 
Working capital is the part of a company's invested capital used to finance short term day-
to-day operational activities.  Generally, in the presence of arrears, inventories and accounts 
receivable are partially covered by non-financial (non-interest bearing) debt to suppliers, the 
state, and other creditors.  The remaining portion of these assets is called working capital and is 
financed with equity and/or debt.  An increase in the level of working capital must be financed 
with additional cash, while a decrease will free additional cash for other uses.  The item called 
changes in working capital is the one that makes automatic adjustments for inflation, no matter 
what method is used to account for inventories. 
 
Table 7 : Increase in Net Working Capital 
 
1994 1997 %Diifference
% of Turnover
Increase in Inventory 8.49% 8.25% -2.85%
Increase in Receivables 8.85% 8.82% -0.36%
Increase in Gross Working Capital 17.34% 17.07% -1.58%
Increase in Suppliers 6.40% 8.62% 34.56%
Increase in Clients/Creditors 0.57% 0.83% 46.49%
Increase in Other Debt 6.34% 7.64% 20.53%
Increase in Non-financial Debt 13.31% 17.08% 28.39%
Increase in Net Working Capital 4.03% -0.02% -100.46%  
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In 1994 the increase in net working capital is positive, that is the companies had to use 
cash to finance it, while in 1997 it has been slightly negative--a small amount of cash has been 
freed and made available for other uses.  We have seen earlier that this was the reason for better 
net cash flow from operations in 1997.  
 
At this point again, the difference in the change in working capital may have two possible 
explanations: better current assets management, or worse financial discipline.  Since the increase 
in gross working capital (inventories and receivables) is quite similar in both years, the 
difference appears from the increase in non-financial debt. Indeed, while the increase in non-
financial debt has been 13% of turnover in 1994, it has been 17 percent of turnover in 1997--a 
difference of almost 30 percent.  
 
The immediate results which can be drawn is that companies have delayed payment of their 
payables, and therefore have obtained additional means to finance working capital increases.  To 
confirm that, we will decompose the companies’ debt structure for 1994 and 1997 into three 
main categories: 
 
• financial debt; 
• current non-financial debt; 
• and overdue non-financial debt. 
 
From the two graphs, it appears that the debt structure remained about the same, but an 
increase by 3 percent of overdue non-financial debt replaced a portion of the financial debt in 
1997. 
 
Based on this last evidence, the hypothesis that the increase in non-financial debt is 
responsible for better net cash flow from operations in 1997 is confirmed. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the improved cash flow performance is, in fact, due to further 
increases in the volume of overdue payments (arrears) to both suppliers and the state, and, as a 
leading cause, to the inability of the environment to enforce some sort of financial discipline. 
 
 
3.  Determinants for Restructuring and Challenges in Implementation 
 
Enterprise restructuring does not take place automatically.  In order to understand what the 
determinants are for firm restructuring, we will now focus on the changes in the relationships 
among firms, on one hand, and creditors, suppliers, owners and employees, on the other hand.  
An enterprise can be viewed as a set of contracts among individuals4.  These contracts represent 
claims on the cash flows generated by the firm’s assets and operations. Restructuring can be 
defined as a process by which firms change the terms of their contracts; therefore, restructuring 
is about renewing and/or restructuring contracts.  Sometimes contracts are restructured through a 
process of negotiation; other times firms unilaterally restructure their contracts.  Economic 
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4 Jensen and Meckling refer to this as a nexus of contracts. 
restructuring affects the level and the timing of the firms' cash flow; it also affects how the cash 
flows are divided up and apportioned among the firms' stakeholders.  The list of stakeholders 
 
Figure 2 : Debt Structure 1994 - 1997 
 
Debt Structure - % of Total Debt 1997
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Debt Structure - % of Total Debt  1994
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Includes shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers and customers.  
 
3.1.  Restructuring Debt Contracts 
 
Restructuring debt contracts changes the relationships with suppliers and the different 
categories of creditors: banks, budget, and others.  Firms that are unprofitable or over-leveraged  
need to restructure their debt contracts.  However, the financial crisis observed by most of the 
state firms has triggered debt restructuring to a limited extent.  This may have happened because 
hard budget and cash constraints were often relaxed and the threat of exit from the market 
through bankruptcy was not credibly enforced.  
 
Firms were Inherited with Cash Deficits 
 
Under the central planning system that operated in Romania until December 1989, the 
Government had virtually complete control over enterprise management and finances.  The 
authorities also had complete discretion in determining the tax burden on individual enterprises.  
Therefore, a distinction between whether state-owned enterprises were actually paying taxes or 
just transferring the profits  to the state budget was not clear.  
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The tax burden increased during the 1980s as the Government needed to generate large 
fiscal surpluses as a part of external debt policy.  As a result, enterprises were left with 
inadequate funds to finance current operations and investment, and often with after-tax losses.  
These losses were financed by extending bank credits.  In addition, bank credit was typically 
extended to clear domestic payment arrears.  Therefore, under the centrally planned system there 
were no enterprise payment arrears as such.  The arrears simply showed up as bad debts on the 
books of the banking system.  The reaction of governments to address the payment arrears 
problem was more targeted to soften the price liberalization shocks.  
 
Blanket Solutions Delayed Restructuring 
 
Starting in late 1990, enterprise payment difficulties appeared in the system.  Price and 
trade liberalization, accompanied by the decline in the domestic and CMEA market, put a serious 
pressure on old firms to restructure.  In late 1991, unpaid bills by these firms mounted to 80% of 
the total enterprise turnover, and almost twice the level of M2.  Arrears of this magnitude created 
a massive “financial blockage” in the economy.  This rapid growth worried the policy makers 
who felt compelled to “solve the problem”  by clearing the stock of enterprise payment arrears.   
 
Thus, a series of selective measures were considered and adopted starting in May 1991, 
culminating with a generalized scheme, termed “global compensation”, which was put into place 
in late December 1991.  Bank credit, partially refinanced by the National Bank, was extended to 
enterprises to allow them to pay off their overdue debts.  Through the motion of serially clearing 
the debts in linked chains of enterprises, it was intended that the outcome would be achieved 
without a massive creation of new money.  The initial bank credit extended under the scheme 
was 1,777 billion lei, of which only 186 billion lei was financed by the NBR.  All payments were 
made from special “compensation accounts” and the same accounts were debited with payments 
received by enterprises.  Thus, the gross amount was transformed into a net amount of about 426 
billion lei.  Because many enterprises that were net creditors to other enterprises were not net 
debtors to the banking system, much of the new credit went initially toward reducing the 
overdrafts with banks. 
 
Although considered, in its own terms, a success, the bailing out has not stopped the 
further rise of enterprise payment arrears.  Moreover, it created the wrong expectations that 
government would be involved in the corporate governance of firms and smoothed the avenue 
for rent-seeking by politically powerful enterprises.  The price paid for this blanket solution was 
twofold: it delayed restructuring of old firms and deteriorated the asset portfolio of the banks. 
 
Relief to Restructuring –“ Isolation” and “Surveillance” Exercises   
 
In 1993 the Government decided that 30 enterprises, among the largest loss makers, be 
placed under the “isolation” program.  The program was designed to provide limited  access to 
bank credits and imposed hard budget constraints.  Exit from the isolation regime was through 
two ways: either divestiture through liquidation or privatization, or significant improvement of 
the financial situation.  By December 1995 only seven companies fulfilled the exit conditions.  
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In 1995 a new version of the “isolation” program was put into place for 151 firms:  the 
“surveillance” regime.  Firms were subject to hard budget constraints, with restricted access to 
bank credit and state ownership fund support.  Their management was expected to design 
financial recovery programs indicating how they wanted to reduce losses and payment arrears 
and to restore positive cash flow.  All firms under surveillance were closely guided to conciliate 
payment arrears with banks, state budget and other creditors, and creditors were imperatively 
asked to accept rescheduling or the writing off of debts.   
 
The outcome of this exercise was that only half of the targeted loss makers met the 
objectives of the program: 31 firms were privatized, 33 were in the process of liquidation and 
only 10 had achieved positive operating cash flow by mid-1997.  The failure of this program was  
acknowledged by the Government in 1997.   
 
Several studies5 have confirmed that isolation and surveillance programs did not deliver 
any tangible improvements in operational performance, nor did it enhance the privatization and 
liquidation of large loss-making enterprises that were included in the program.  Moreover, they 
faced softer budget constraints than other enterprises outside the program through access to 
special funds and government subsidies.  Thus, relative to 1992, the situation in 1996 reflects an 
improvement for the companies outside the program in all aspects.  Isolated firms retained a 
higher employment level (Z-statistic of 4.980 in 1996 as compared to 2.662 in 1992), became 
less profitable (Z-statistic of –4.679 in 1996 as compared to –1.642 in 1992) and received more 
budgetary transfers (Z-statistic of 10.524 in 1996 to 7.809 in 1992).  It is worth mentioning that 
overall results in all indicators are driven by the inclusion of the agriculture firms (74 poultry and 
pig farms).  Once this sector is excluded, the 1992 and 1996 differences between the two groups 
become insignificant.  
 
As in the case of a blanket solution, the government initiating the cancellation or 
socialization of debt (replacing enterprise debt with government debt) was a dangerous endeavor 
because it relaxed cash constraints and also invited rent-seeking from the politically powerful 
enterprises.  In the name of “restructuring”, restructuring was delayed once again. 
 
The Magnitude of the Problem 
 
Starting in 1990, enterprise payment arrears were evident in the system.  The growth of 
arrears accelerated sharply.  By the end of 1991, arrears rose to 1,777 billion, representing about 
81% of GDP, and exceeded broad money by 1.8 times.  The growth of arrears closely matched 
the rise in the consumer price level.  It appears that the arrears were implicitly indexed to the 
price level, in that when creditor enterprises were not paid on time they would re-bill the debtor 
enterprises at the new, higher prices (Figure 3). 
 
After 1992, enterprise payment arrears continued to rise so that, by end 1997, they 
mounted to 78,649 billion lei.  A similar pattern was observed in the state-owned sector.  Thus, 
the stock arrears by the end of 1997 amounted to 41,625 billion lei in the state sector (Figure 4). 
                                                 
5 “Barriers against restructuring in Romania” – Lucian Croitoru; 
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  “Enterprise Isolation Programs in Transition Economies” - Simeon Djankov 
 
However, the stock of payment arrears in both the whole economy and the state sector had 
a tendency to flatten out in terms of the price level. 
 
Figure 3 : Arrears, Broad Money and GDP  1990 - 1992 
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Figure 4 : Broad Money, Inter-enterprise Arrears, and GDP 
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And Again, Relief to Restructuring 
 
The structure of the payment arrears gives a better picture of the hard budget constraint 
tightness on enterprises (Figure 5).  Inter-enterprise credit declined6 from 72 percent to 33 
percent of the total stock of payment arrears, while arrears to the budget and to other creditors 
have increased continuously, even in real terms (Figure 6).  56 percent of total arrears in the state 
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6 1995 stocks are understated owing to the write – off of some arrears as part of the debt conciliation in the fall of 1995.  
sector were arrears to the state budget and to other creditors (employment, health funds, etc).  
This reflects a serious relaxation of budget constraints for enterprises from both the budget as 
well as banks.  
 
Figure 5 : Enterprise Payment Arrears  - Real Prices 
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Figure 6 : Categories of  the Total Stock of Payment Arrears - Real Prices 
      Reactions from Creditors 
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Very often the state, in its twin capacity as owner and creditor, explains the delays in 
restructuring as largely caused by the inadequate legal framework for bankruptcy, lack of 
infrastructure (i.e. registries, courts, etc) and problems with implementation.  But, at the same 
time, it was argued that state-owned companies should not be left out of Government “hands”.  
Another argument often used was that administrative decisions to close down operations or to 
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liquidate enterprises should not completely rely on market solutions.  Creditors, from the list of 
which the state was implicitly excluded, should have been the ones to initiate financial 
reorganization or liquidation procedures.  
 
Although there is no need for bankruptcy to close value-subtracting firms, the state-owner 
very reluctantly has chosen this path.  This was done mostly at the pressure of the international 
financing institutions and covered a low percentage of the loss-making enterprise sector.  Only in 
the last three years has liquidation had some impact, and it was limited to the state ownership 
portfolio.  Thus, by the end of 1998, SOF had divested 171 state companies from its portfolio 
through judicial reorganization and liquidation.  The losses made by these companies represented 
32 % of SOF's entire portfolio as of 1997, and 10 % of the losses in all of the state-owned 
economy.   
 
The state–creditor had a contradictory and unequal reaction.  On one side, it tried to 
enforce hard budget and cash constraints.  It penalized and rewarded.  However, the net result 
was that arrears ballooned.  
 
The creditor–suppliers also had slow reactions.  There were several reasons for this. First, 
firms that did not restructure their operations and products had no reason to act upon debtors. 
Second, the government intervened in business decisions and forced firms to supply, irrespective 
of payment.  Third, arrears to suppliers decreased in real terms which may mean that 
restructuring is undergoing or simply that cash constraints were relaxed enough by other 
creditors, such as the budget and the banks  
 
Thus, the total number of state companies under bankruptcy, either through liquidation or 
financial reorganization, amounts to 3587 companies with combined assets of more than 7,000 
billion lei.  Figures 7 and 8 present the liquidations and financial reorganizations initiated by the 
different stakeholders, listed by the number of enterprises and value of capital stock, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 7 :  Firms in Bankruptcy and Financial Reorganization – by Number 
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Figure 8 : Firms in Bankruptcy and Financial Reorganization – by Capital Stock 
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Entry and Exit – A Final  Perspective 
 
Hard budget and cash constraints and bankruptcy are the essential driving forces for 
restructuring old firms.  However, they represent only one side of  the coin of economic change. 
The other side is entrepreneurship: new firms.  Restructuring without these two essentials can not 
be enforced.  New firms close the resource reallocation circle.  
 
3.2.  Restructuring Equity Contracts 
 
Firms can create value by restructuring their equity contracts.  Methods for creating new 
classes of shareholders include ownership changes through takeovers and privatizations.  In a 
Western market economy, the incentive to restructure derives from the presence of markets that 
reflect discrepancies between the potential and the current realized market value of firms.  What 
triggers equity restructuring is the private claim to the potential increase in value; either a firm 
would defensively restructure itself in response to the decline in its value, or outsiders, whose 
perceptions of a firm's potential profitability exceeds the current market value, decide to 
purchase part or all the firm and undertake restructuring.   
 
Obviously such ability of the market to impose discipline on enterprises is not present yet.   
Although most of the state firms are potentially tradable on the capital markets, only  fractions of 
their equity are being actually traded.  These equity fractions are not large enough to offer a 
controlling position in the firms. Although the state has the possibility to sell its shares on the 
capital markets, it vary rarely chooses to do so and only for residual positions.  Therefore, 
takeovers are very limited.  Threats to takeover firms are not credible, and thus, the expected 
effect on firms’ restructuring is almost null. 
 
Privatization of state firms started in 1992.  There have been eight years of transition and 
yet only 6,208 companies have been privatized.  They represent about 37.5 percent of the initial 
stock portfolio of the State Ownership Fund, and about 20 percent of the stock of all state-owned 
enterprises, including regies. 
 
We have tried to find a correlation between improvement in performance and change of 
ownership. From the panel of 6,203 firms analyzed previously, 4,228 firms were found to have a 
 15
positive cash flow from operations (group F).  About 58 percent of the group F firms are firms 
where the state has sold at least the controlling position (33 percent of the equity).  In about 40 
percent of the firms in group F, the state has retained a minority position.  The results are not 
conclusive to explain the positioning of  firms in group F by the change in ownership. 
 
3.3.  Restructuring Employee Contracts 
 
The legacy of the misallocation of all resources, including labor, made restructuring of old 
firms very difficult.  Firms inherited from the central planning system were usually overstaffed 
as compared to similar companies even from the other former socialist countries.  Labor costs 
represented one of the largest expense categories for most of these firms.  Although wages were 
quite low, the high number of employees raised labor costs to significant levels.  
 
The  pressures to restructuring (the cost structure) of the firms determined invariably 
lowering down labor costs.  Different alternatives had to be used for controlling these costs, 
including layoffs, negotiated wages, and voluntary early retirement programs.  All these 
alternatives were in fact ways to restructure employees contracts.  While undertaking such 
restructuring,  managers had to consider some of the characteristics of these contracts.  First, 
employee contracts are less formal than debt contracts or equity contracts, so to a certain extent, 
they are easier to restructure.  Second, employees are a factor of production.  Layoffs and wage 
reduction can indirectly impact a firm’s profits through changes in employee productivity and 
morale.  But also equally important was the constant political interference when layoff decisions 
were made.  
 
One of the most significant indicators testifying to the existence of an initial restructuring  
of old firms is the decline by 23.6 percent of employment in state industries from 1989 to 1992.  
However, this labor adjustment was different across industries.  Large adjustments occurred in 
textiles, machinery, equipment, instrument and furniture manufacturing.  The low level of 
adjustment in other industries, such as coal mining, petroleum, natural gas, and  utilities was 
explained8 by the role of government policy variables in influencing the employment behavior of 
the firms.  Thus, industries  receiving subsidies and those in which regii autonomes are more 
present were less likely to adjust.  Also, evidence was provided that a pattern of favoritism in 
some unmeasurable dimensions is responsible for inter-industry differences in the degree of 
employment adjustment. 
 
One of the industries where the restructuring of employee contracts was difficult and in 
turmoil is the mining industry.  Miners have historically had preferential status, high wages and 
political influence.  Until 1997, the downsizing of the labor force was mainly a result of the 
natural decline.  But the change in governmental policies towards this industry in 1997 through 
the transformation of the regies into commercial companies and the imposition of hard budget 
constraints through subsidies reduction triggered the restructuring of this industry as well.  The 
preferential status of the miners was observed again when the government designed the 
instruments to enforce employee contract restructuring.  Thus, about 82,500 miners, representing 
about 44 percent of the labor force in the mining sector in 1996, accepted voluntary layoffs 
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8 “Aggregate Labor Market Behavior in the Restructuring of the Romanian Economy” – John Earle and Gheorghe Oprescu 
against severance payments amounting to up to 20 times their monthly net salaries.  The position 
of the trade unions on the change of employment terms for the 82,500 miners was contradictory.  
Although unions accused the government that it was the one triggering the layoffs of so 
numerous a labor force, in practice however, they were actively involved in the implementation 
of such policy.  Later on, any involvement was denied and the government was accused of 
creating “ chaos and disaster”9 in the mining industry.   
 
The net results of this restructuring remain unclear.  While the reduction of the labor force 
was about 44% as compared to 1996, the reduction of the labor cost in total operating costs 
remained about the same (Figure 9 and Figure 10).   
 
Figure 9 : Cost of Labor/Total Operating Cost 
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9 “With Miners Eyes” -  M. Larionescu,  C.Rughinis, S. Radulescu 
In addition, table 8 presents an overview of the financial performance in the mining sector 
over 1996 to 1998 as well as the impact of the employee contract restructuring. 
 
 
Table 8 
 
The mining companies represent an important share of the losses before subsidies 
incurred  by the state-owned sector.  Thus, in 1996 they represented 20.3%, in 1997 around 19% 
and by mid-1998 about 29.9%.  Although important measures aimed to cut costs were taken 
during 1997, such as the closure of 76 mining operations followed by collective layoffs (81,500 
employees), the financial performance of the mining companies continued to deteriorate.  The 
only exception is the National Company of Lignite Tg. Jiu which recorded a small profit. 
 
The losses from operations have been reduced in real terms.  The losses/GDP of the 
mining companies increased from 0.57% in 1996, to 0.71% in 1997 and 0.86% by mid-1998.  
However, it should be noted that the losses from operations/GDP decreased from 0.36% in 1996 
to 0.19% in 1997 and 0.20% by mid-1998.  That means that during 1997 a reduction of the losses 
from operations  of about 47% in real terms took place. 
 
Significant cost reduction measures were taken, but  they were practically offset by the 
increase of salaries on one hand and the decrease of revenues on the other hand.  The 
deterioration of the financial situation in 1998 is due to several causes.  The revenues decreased 
as a consequence of a demand decrease by 25 - 30% and of the lack of price adjustments to 
reflect the lei's depreciation during the second part of 1997 and 1998.  On the cost side, although 
the employee numbers were reduced by 47%, the cost of labor in total operating expenses 
increased from 50% in 1996 to 51 % by mid-1998.  These factors together created an increase of 
operational loss per employee by more than 120%.   
 
The total losses/GDP are four times higher than the losses from operation/GDP.  With 
only one exception, the Lignite Company, all the other mining companies have negative cash 
flows from operations.  Therefore, the financing of operations is done by delaying payments  to 
creditors and especially to the state budget.  The penalties and interest create the accumulation of 
huge losses from exceptional activities.  
 
Huge power of the customers, and especially of Conel, further deteriorates liquidity.  
The lack of liquidity is further aggravated by the way Conel (the electricity company) is paying 
the bills for coal purchased.  The payment is not done in cash, but in so called "bilete de 
compensare" (compensation notes).  At the most, Conel pays cash for only the amount necessary 
for the mining companies to cover their salary bill.  Therefore, very often, there is no cash left  
for paying taxes to the budget.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
The restructuring of old firms inherited from the centrally planned system is a key policy 
issue for the success of transition reforms.  What can governments do to speed up the 
restructuring of these firms?  From the analyses presented in this paper, several conclusions can 
be drawn which may address this question. 
 
First, an increased number of firms are performing better in 1997 as compared to 1994.  
However, it was shown that the improved cash flow generation performance is, in fact, due to a 
further increase in the volume of overdue payments to both the suppliers and state.  
 
Second, the financial crises observed by most of the firms was triggered to a limited extent 
by debt restructuring.  Hard budget constraints have been acknowledged to be vital by different 
governments but enforcement has been contradictory.  Blanket solutions to arrears problems 
relaxed the cash constraints on enterprises.  Case by case solutions, as the “isolation” exercise 
was, have proven to be a “hospital” rather than a “jail”.  Moreover, the state has played 
conflicting interest positions, being creditor, owner and debtor at the same time.  Therefore, 
bankruptcy could not have become a credible threat for companies to restructure themselves.   
 
Third, the presence of these firms on the capital markets was almost null.  Threats to taking 
over firms were not credible, and thus, the incentive to restructure which should have come from 
the private claim to the potential increase in value, could not be exercised.    
 
Fourth, the restructuring of employee contracts has proven difficult and produced unclear 
results.  Although less formal than debt contracts or equity contracts and thus easier to 
restructure, constant political interference when employees layoff decisions occurred made the 
restructuring of such contracts sensitive to implement. 
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